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Abstract
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an important economic phenomenon with broad impli-
cations for ￿rms, employees, consumers, investors, governments and NGOs alike. This paper collects,
structures and combines scattered pieces of economic theory and empirical evidence in novel ways that
shed light on various fundamental economic questions related to CSR. The main conjecture presents
individual preferences as the ultimate driving force behind any form of CSR. In the presence of social
stakeholder preferences, ￿rms may use strategic CSR to maximize pro￿ts, while not-for-pro￿t CSR
may satisfy shareholders￿social ambitions. Only if managers take CSR beyond strategic levels or
shareholder preferences, does CSR constitute moral hazard. Incentives and mechanisms underlying
for-pro￿t CSR will be outlined in greater detail. Six frameworks for the analysis of strategic CSR
are proposed and analyzed. Finally, some empirical issues related to measurement and estimation of
CSR are brie￿ y discussed.
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1 Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) constitutes an economic phenomenon of signi￿cant importance.
Numerous surveys ￿nd that a substantial share of consumers has preferences for social or environmental
performance of ￿rms and that managers now consider CSR practices as an essential building block of
￿rm strategy. The rise of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) and respective "ethical" indices (e.g.
KLD Domini 400 Social Index, Dow Jones Sustainability Index, or the FTSE4Good Index) suggests that
investors base their investment decisions not only on ￿nancial, but also on social and environmental
performance criteria. Hence, CSR is referred to as one of the social pressures ￿rms have absorbed1
and considered to have become a mainstream activity of ￿rms2. Many national and international ￿rms,
among which most of the Fortune 100, strive to achieve social and environmental standards such as
the Corporate Giving Standard3 or ISO14001, and the number of related certi￿cations in OECD (high
income) countries as well as in emerging markets is constantly growing4. At the same time, the Public
carefully observes corporations and their involvement with social ills, environmental degradation or
￿nancial contagion, while political decision makers try to ￿nd out where their responsibility and ability
to regulate ￿rm behaviour ends and Corporate Social Responsibility begins. In this context, Scherer
and Palazzo (2008) note that paradoxically, today, business ￿rms are not just considered the bad guys,
causing environmental disasters, ￿nancial scandals, and social ills. They are at the same time considered
the solution of global regulation and public goods problems, thereby underlining that CSR opens up a
wide array of economic questions and puzzles.
Consequently, the focus of research into CSR recently started to shift from whether CSR should
exist to how it a⁄ects the economy, stressing the need of analytical machinery to better understand the
1John Ruggy (Harvard University) in the Economist (January 17) 2008 special report on CSR.
2See The Economist (January 19, 2008): Just good business - A special report on corporate social responsibility and
The Economist Intelligence Unit (2005) Global Survey asking 136 senior executives and 65 institutional investors to assess
the importance of CSR.
3issued by the Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP) in 2007 ("Corporate Giving in Numbers 2007").
4See OECD Working Papers on International Investment No 2005/3 (Baskin and Gordon 2005).
2mechanisms underlying CSR5. Economics, among other social sciences such as sociology, political science
or management studies6, actively contributes to the study of CSR. Therefore, the objective of this paper
is to identify, structure and assess the quali￿cation of economic tools applied to theoretic and empirical
aspects of CSR.
More precisely, CSR entails a set of implications that opens up discussion of the predominant neoclas-
sical ￿rm paradigm and asks for novel application of existing or the design of new economic tools. Well
established areas of economic research that contribute to the analysis of CSR include public economics,
information economics, contract theory and industrial organization. CSR often is intimately connected
with the provision of public goods by or the origin of externalities (social or environmental) within ￿rms.
As public goods and externalities entail market failure, government provision through direct production
or regulation may be most e¢ cient. This concept became generally known as Friedman￿ s classical di-
chotomy. If ￿rms still decide to engage in costly social behaviour beyond regulatory levels, i.e. CSR, then
why would they voluntarily incur these costs? The attempt to answer this question leads to the ￿rm￿ s
classical objective - maximizing shareholder value - and its dependence on the nature of shareholders￿
and stakeholders￿preferences. Actual as well as future shareholders (investors) can be pro￿t (money)
oriented or have social and environmental preferences. The same is true for consumers, while workers
may be extrinsically and/or intrinsically motivated. Economics o⁄ers analytical tools able to shed light
on individual behaviour and contracting between economic agents in product and labor markets, in the
presence of social preferences as well as aggravating circumstances such as asymetric information or col-
lective action problems. The importance of information about CSR with quality/content, ranging from
advertising to third party certi￿cation is well documented. On the one hand, 25% of all Global Fortune
500 and nearly 10% of all S&P100 companies report in detail on their CSR activities and seek legitimiza-
tion from governments (among wich the UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, South
Africa and all Scandianvian countries), international organizations (such as the Japanese Development
Bank, OECD or the Worldbank among others), Non-Pro￿ts and private Auditors7. On the other hand,
a recent US survey by Fleishman-Hillard and the National Consumers League ￿nds that technology is
changing the landscape in which consumers gather and communicate information about CSR. In detail,
52% of all respondents seek information about a company￿ s CSR record all the time or sometimes, while
internet access in general has created a more informed, more empowered consumer...searching for an
un￿ltered view of news and information. Given these trends, the conclusion is that ￿rms seek to build
social or environmental reputation subject to the workings and channels of the market for information
about CSR.
Last but not least, Industrial Organization may enhance the understanding of CSR by explaining how
the underlying "social pressures" a⁄ect market structure (downstream as well as upstream), competition
(CSR might act as product di⁄erentiation, entry barrier etc.) and total welfare. In order to gain a more
complete picture, this paper aims to clarify what is known and where Economics has arrived in modeling
CSR. To that end, various relevant strands of literature in economics and partly management studies
(including but not limited to the above mentioned) are reviewed and linked to empirical evidence at
hand.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 de￿nes CSR and discusses the classical dichotomy
between the public and private sectors in light of CSR. Section 3 identi￿es and structures the contribution
of economic theory to the ￿eld so far. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 motivate and outline the role of preferences
in the emergence of CSR, and conclude that the major form of CSR is strategic in nature and fully
consistent with pro￿t maximization. Subsection 3.3 gives a structured overview of distinctive theoretic
explanations of strategic CSR in light of respective empirical evidence. Section 4 touches upon some
empirical issues related to CSR and section 5 concludes.
5This "next question" about CSR has been emphasized by John Ruggie of Harvard University￿ s JFK School of Govern-
ment among other leading scholars in the ￿eld.
6For a comprehensive investigation of the status of CSR research within the management literature see Lockett, Moon
and Visser (2006).
7The joint e⁄ort to establish a common framework for corporate Social Auditing, Accounting and Reporting (SAAR)
led to several big joint public-private ventures such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or Institute of Social and
Ethical Accountability (ISEA).
32 What is CSR? From De￿nition to Analysis
Before entering economic analysis, the stage has to be set by de￿ning Corporate Social Responsibility.
In practice, a variety of de￿nitions of CSR exists. The European Commission (2002)8 de￿nes Corporate
Social Responsibility as "a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis". The
Worldbank states: "CSR is the commitment of businesses to behave ethically and to contribute to sus-
tainable economic development by working with all relevant stakeholders to improve their lives in ways
that are good for business, the sustainable development agenda, and society at large".9 A notion similar
to "voluntary behaviour" can be found in de￿nitions of CSR that refer to either "beyond compliance"
such as those used by Vogel (2005) or McWilliams and Siegel (2001), who characterize CSR as "the ful￿ll-
ment of responsibilities beyond those dictated by markets or laws", or to "self regulation" as suggested
by Calveras et al. (2006) among others. These attempts to de￿ne CSR reveal two basic conceptual
features: First, CSR manifests itself in some observable and measurable behaviour or output. The lit-
erature frequently refers to this outcome dimension as Corporate Social or Environmental Performance
(CSP or CEP). Second, the social or environmental performance or output of ￿rms exceeds levels set by
obligatory regulations or standards enforced by laws10. In essence, CSR is corporate social or environ-
mental behaviour that goes beyond the legal (regulatory) requirements of the relevant market(s) and/or
economy(s).
This de￿nition is independent of any conjecture about the motivations underlying CSR11, thereby
constituting a strong fundament for economic theory to adress incentives and mechanisms beneath CSR.
In order to capture its complete economic relevance, this view of CSR is in line with Baron (2001) in
that CSR can be market driven or "strategic" as opposed to McWilliams and Siegel (2001), who equate
CSR only with social or environmental performance "beyond market forces".
2.1 A "Neo-Classical" Dichotomy
As CSR is intimately related to ￿rm behaviour and output within the realms of regulation and government
involvement, a valid point of departure might be to reevaluate those characteristics of goods or behaviour
(collective action) that are at the core of the classical dichotomy12 between state and market, therefore
de￿ning the border between government and corporate responsibilities. In general, the realization of
CSR either is a good (or reduction of a bad) with at least some public good characteristic, or a positive
(reduction of a negative) externality. Relevant works that relate CSR exclusively with public good
provision include Bagnoli and Watts (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2007), who explicitly de￿ne CSR as
the corporate provision of public goods or curtailment of public bads (negative externalities).When CSR
takes the form of an environmental public good produced alongside a private good such as in Kotchen
(2006), it certainly exhibits non rivalry and non excludability to some extent. However, CSR might
share just one of the two properties of a classic public good, as is the case with recognition of human
and worker rights in employment relationships. Here, CSR is non rival among workers in a ￿rm, but
clearly excludable, as it just bene￿ts the subset of those agents employed by the respective corporation.
In short, ￿rms often produce a (partly) public good or an externality jointly with private (consumption)
8Commission of the European Communities: "Communication from the Commission concerningcorporate social respon-
sibility: A business contribution to sustainable development", July 2002, COM (2002) 347 Final, p.5.
9For yet another de￿nition of CSR along these lines see the OECD￿ s 182 codes of conduct.
10Earlier attempts to develop a clear concept and establish the boundaries between de￿nition and analysis of CSR include
Locke (2002) and Mc Williams, Siegel and Wright (2006) among others. Locke (2002) structures models of CSR along
two dimensions: Motivation (instrumental versus ethical) and Bene￿ciaries (shareholders versus stakeholders). He ￿nds
that there is signi￿cant divergence of opinion over key issues such as the role of management (contractual versus beyond
contractual obligations), the relation to pro￿ts (Is CSR pro￿t enhancing?) or the scope of responsibility (direct versus
indirect e⁄ects of conduct of business).
11While Baron (2001) takes the (normative) view that "both motivation and performance are required for actions to
receive the CSR label", I propose that linking a particular motivation to the respective performance is required for the
action to receive the correct CSR label (e.g. strategic or altruistic).
12Milton Friedman
4goods, either in connection with the production process of private goods (e.g. less polluting technology
or safe/healthy working conditions) or linked to the private good/service itself (e.g. less polluting cars or
energy saving light bulps). This perspective on CSR relates directly to earlier work by J.M. Buchanan
(1999), who refered to this joint provision of a public and private good as an "impure public good", and
relevant insights such as those derived by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (BBV 1986) in their seminal
paper on the private provision of public goods can be readily translated into the CSR framework. For
example, BBV (1986) focused on the interaction between public and private (individual) provision of
the public good and the e⁄ect on overall levels of provision, and concluded that public provision crowds
out its private counterpart almost perfectly. Along these lines Kotchen (2006) compares joint corporate
provision of private and public goods in "green markets"13 and separate provision of either, leading
him to the similar conclusion that the very same crowding out takes place between corporate provision
and individual (what BBV called "private") provision and may even lead to an overall reduction in the
level of the public good. In this context, CSR can be interpreted as a shift of public good provision
between competing supply channels. More precisely, Besley and Ghatak (BG 2001) notice that public
goods provision has dramatically shifted from public to mixed or complete private ownership in recent
years, while Rose-Ackerman (1996) phrases the problem as the blurring of the analytically motivated
division between for-pro￿t, nonpro￿t and public sectors in reality. To explain these observations, BG
(2001) suggest that in the presence of incomplete contracts, optimal ownership is not a question of
public versus private provision but simply should involve the party that values the created bene￿ts most.
Another interesting rationale provided by Besley and Ghatak (2007) identi￿es economies of scope to
be the decisive variable in determining e¢ ciency of impure public goods. The conclusion states that if
economies of scope are absent, tasks should be segregated into specialized organizations (governments
provide public goods and ￿rms private ones), while otherwise CSR is an e¢ cient way of delivering public
goods. Both ￿ndings are of immediate importance to those authorities involved in the mechanism design
of public good provision.
A simple thought experiment may illuminate CSR related welfare analysis. It will identify a basic
trade o⁄ between government and market provision of social or environmental good by sketching the
production of welfare in the presence of various preferences of consumers and non-consumers. Compar-
ative statics (see Graph 1 next page) reveal a potential for (1) divergence between public good levels
supplied by government and CSR, or, ceteris paribus, (2) di⁄ering allocation of costs of the public good.
Assume for a moment that ￿rms only take into account preferences of those groups that are relevant
for their pro￿ts (e.g. consumer preferences). This most likely will be a subgroup of society at large.
Then, if the public good is intrinsically bundled with the ￿rm (BG 2007), the government can assure its
provision only via uniform regulation and various trade o⁄s may arise. If the government is ￿rst best (full
information and benevolence)14, it can achieve optimal public goods levels, which might come at a cost
for ￿rms or subgroups of consumers. It is possible that consumers with no preference for the public good
(neutral consumers) pay higher prices for the private good (up to their maximum valuation) while those
with respective preferences (ethical consumers) pay relatively less. If ￿rms serving neutral consumers are
regulated and neutral consumers are not willing to pay the increased price for the private good anymore,
these ￿rms su⁄er losses. A similar issue might arise even when the government can produce the public
good itself. If the policy vehicle is a uniform head tax, it is the structure of the respective "target group"
of ￿rms and governments as well as di⁄erences between the two that determine optimality of public ver-
sus corporate provision. In general, CSR can be e¢ cient due to the distributional advantages of product
variety and pricing vis-a-vis uniform government policies. If ethical consumers are a minority, govern-
ments might not regulate at all and CSR constitutes a pareto improvement. If ethical consumers form
a majority, governments might overprovide the public good. Then comparative welfare again depends
on the ratio between neutral and ethical consumers as well as consumers and non-consumers, however,
13The de￿nition of a "green" market is based on technologies with joint production of a private good and an environmental
public good, i.e. a kind of "green" impure public good.
14If there is government failure, the case for CSR might be substantialæly stronger, however, here it is shown that even
under perfect government there exists a trade o⁄ between public and corporate provision of public goods and a niche for
CSR.
5neutral consumers and non-consumers pay taxes for something they do not care about. In this example
(Graph 1) the result crucially depends on the potential e⁄ect of "free riding" under CSR by subgroup
n6.
In sum, CSR might be suboptimal from a total welfare perspective as it just takes account of consumer
preferences (partial welfare), while public provision of the public good can reach ￿rst best levels but might
be ine¢ cient from a distribution of welfare point of view, as it accounts (in some way) for all preferences,
but makes neutral (non) consumers pay. In other words, markets may be optimal within a subset of
society and sometimes pareto improve total welfare, while governments may get total welfare right, but
optimal allocation wrong. Given certain conditions, it is this trade o⁄ that must be taken into account
when choosing the optimal provision strategy of ￿rm related public goods or policy outcomes accoriding
to distributional preferences.
POPULATION
Let x be a private consumption good and SEG be a Social or Environmental Good related to the production of
x, the firm producing x, or x itself.
Preferences for SEG only if
consumption of x
Preferences for SEG independent
of consumption of x
Do not

















LEVELS OF PUBLIC GOOD
AND ALLOCATION OF
COSTS dependent on ratio
n6/(n1+n3) and preferences.
Graph 1: CSR and the Potential Trade O⁄ between Levels of Public Good and Allocation of Welfare
However, while analyzing CSR through a "public goods lens" o⁄ers important insights into welfare
implications and e¢ ciency of CSR and allows for a comparison and normative choice between competing
supply channels, it only partly sheds light on the motivations behind CSR (e.g. Bagnoli and Watts (2003)
or Kotchen (2006) assume consumer preferences at the bottom of CSR). To get a more complete picture of
what might cause ￿rms to be socially or environmentally responsible beyond legal requirements, the next
section develops a categorization of CSR along motivational lines and across theoretical frameworks. CSR
can be subclassi￿ed as either "strategic", market driven CSR, which is perfectly compatible with pro￿t
maximization and Milton Friedman￿ s view of the "socially responsible ￿rm", or as not-for-pro￿t CSR that
comes at a net monetary cost for shareholders. However, foregone pro￿ts15 and costs implied by CSR need
15Note that Reinhardt, Stavins and Vietor (2008) de￿ne CSR in this spirit as "sacri￿cing pro￿ts in the social interest".
6not be at odds with the principle of shareholder value maximization and do not automatically constitute
moral hazard (between management/agent and owner/principle) if shareholders have respective intrinsic
(social or environmental) preferences that substitute for utility derived from extrinsic (monetary) sources.
I.e. any explanation of CSR (strategic or not) builds upon the recent advancement of new concepts of
individual behaviour in economics and the related departure of economic theory from the classical homo
oeconomicus assumption16. In fact, CSR and the related departure from the neoclassical ￿rm paradigm
is closely linked to the extension of traditional individual rational choice theory towards a broader set of
attitudes, preferences and calculations.
3 From Whether to Why? Economic Theory and the Evolu-
tionary Understanding of CSR
Initial research into CSR was dominated by the question of whether ￿rms do have any social responsi-
bility other than employing people, producing goods or services and maximizing pro￿ts. However, ￿rms
increasingly engaged into CSR activities that, at ￿rst sight, seemed to be outside the original, neoclassical
boundaries. Hence, research shifted focus to why ￿rms actually do CSR. Both questions, whether and
why CSR, are intimately related to each other and will be jointly adressed in the following subsections.
3.1 Milton Friedman and CSR
Should ￿rms engage into CSR, and if so, why (not)? In this respect, Milton Friedman (1970) examined
the doctrine of the social responsibility of business and rightly concluded that the only responsibility of
business is to maximize pro￿ts, i.e. shareholder value, while goods or curtailment of bads (externalities)
based on public preferences or social objectives should be provided by governments endowed wit demo-
cratic legitimation and the power to correct market ine¢ ciencies17. This view suggested that CSR was
a manifestation of moral hazard towards shareholders and not only ine¢ cient, but also inconsistent with
the neoclassical ￿rm￿ s pro￿t orientation. But, rather than putting the dicussion about CSR to a halt,
Friedman￿ s thoughts provoked the search for an economic justi￿cation of CSR in line with neoclassical
economics. The breakthrough came with the idea that CSR may actually be a necessary part of strategy
for a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm. In other words, pro￿t maximization can be a motivation for CSR.
But how may CSR be integrated into the objective function of the pro￿t maximizing ￿rm? The
answer to this question builds upon the existence of preferences that are beyond those of the classical
homo oeconomicus. Stakeholders such as consumers or employees and/or shareholders often are socially
or, in general, intrinsically motivated, a fact that pro￿t maximizing ￿rms cannot ignore as it directly
a⁄ects demand in product markets and/or supply in labor markets. These preferences might also poten-
tially a⁄ect ￿rms indirectly through governments or regulators translating voter preferences into market
interventions. In sum, social stakeholder preferences translate into some sort of action or behaviour
relevant to corporate pro￿ts18, therefore qualifying CSR as part of a pro￿t maximizing strategy. CSR
induced by demand side pressures or as a hedge against the risk of future regulation has been termed
"strategic CSR" by D. Baron (2001), while McWilliams and Siegel (2001) refer to the same underlying
pro￿t orientation of CSR as a "theory of the ￿rm perspective".
If shareholders (or private ￿rm owners) have preferences allowing them to derive intrinsic utility
equivalent to extrinsic, monetary utility, any resulting social or environmental corporate performance
constitutes a non-strategic form of CSR that is equally consistent with Friedman￿ s view of the ￿rm. Here,
the objective of the ￿rm re￿ ects the preferences of its owner(s) and therefore might involve a reduction
of pro￿ts or even net losses without breaking the rule of shareholder value maximization (i.e. no moral
hazard). Obviously, if ownership and management are fused into one and the same person, as is the
16See Section 3.2 for a detailed discussion.
17such as Free Riding or Collective Action Problems.
18Think of ￿rms that expect consumers to buy preferably green or fair trade products, investors to prefer shares in low
polluting companies or governments (responsible to voters) regulating in favor of environmentally friendly technologies and
against breaches to human rights.
7case for "social entrepreneurs" (Baron 2005), the absence of moral hazard is substituted by simple and
coherent individual utility maximization.
So Friedman￿ s concept of CSR being equal to pro￿t maximization has been basically con￿rmed and
enriched by taking account of a new set of stakeholder and shareholder preferences. The result is a
bipolar conception of CSR being either strategic (pro￿t oriented due to social stakeholder preferences)
or not for pro￿t (social shareholder preferences) with varying implications for the ￿nancial performance



























































Not For Profit CSR
Mixed Effect on Profits
Strategic CSR
Profit Maximization
Not For Profit CSR
Negative Effect on Profits
No CSR
Profit Maximization
Graph 2: Typology of CSR
From the perspective of the ￿rm, strategic CSR has a strong reactive notion as it is induced by
an outside party such as consumers, activists or potential employees, while not for pro￿t CSR can be
considered active as the initiative to foster social good actively derives from intrinsic motivation inside
the ￿rm.
After having established consistency between strategic CSR and the pro￿t maximizing ￿rm, optimal-
ity conditions for CSR have been searched for along the lines of the discussion in section 1 ("public goods
lens"). Besley and Ghatak (2007) show that CSR might Pareto improve social welfare as compared to
complete government provision of public goods. The logic behind this argument runs as follows: Given
that consumers use ￿rms￿strategic CSR e⁄orts as close substitutes for private, voluntary contributions
to public goods such as donations, an increase in strategic CSR should crowd out public supply of public
goods, or vice versa, as established by BBV (1986). Then, it follows that for CSR to be optimal in terms
of welfare, ￿rms must be at least as e¢ cient as governments in providing certain public goods. This
might be the case in the presence of government failure or simple comparative advantage of markets
vis-a-vis governments or NGOs (economies of scope).
Further analysis will identify a more detailed framework and distinguish the respective economic
channels that lead to CSR. The analysis will include separate treatment of product markets (i.e. the
￿rm-consumer relationship), ￿nancial markets (i.e. the ￿rm-investor relationship) as well as interaction
between activists, governments and ￿rms among others. However, before doing so, the following sub-
section will discuss the crucial role of individual preferences in the economic analysis of CSR in more
detail.
83.2 A new Set of Preferences
It was again Milton Friedman, who explicitly pointed out that to understand any form of social respon-
sibility it is essential to notice that society is a collection of individuals and of the various groups they
voluntarily form. This means that any attempt to investigate organizational (including ￿rm) behaviour
needs to look at incentives, preferences and motivations of individual share- and stakeholders. Stiglitz
(1993 and 2002) talks about new concepts to be taken into account when modeling individual behaviour.
Gary Becker (1993) proposes an Economic Way of Looking at Behaviour, stressing the importance of a
richer class of attitudes, preferences and calculations for individual choice theory. What both Friedman
and Becker have in mind is a new class of psychological and sociological ideas that recently entered
microeconomic theory in general and the individual agent￿ s utility function in particular. More precisely,
standard motivational assumptions have been expanded and a literature on intrinsic (non-pecuniary
including social) aspects of motivation has emerged.
As the Behavioural Economics literature19 is rather extensive and a comprehensive review certainly
lies beyond the scope of this paper, only a few selected contributions that are believed to improve the
understanding of CSR will be analyzed.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000 and 2005) speci￿cally recognize the importance of identity in deriving
utility, while Benabou and Tirole (2003 and 2006) as well as Besley and Ghatak (2005) more generally
assume that agents have preferences for money, social/public goods and reputation. A ￿rst important
insight deriving from this assumption is that intrinsic motivation can act as a substitute for extrinsic
monetary incentives. This has interesting and novel implications for pricing through the potential increase
in consumers￿ willingness to pay, and for determining incentives in employment contracts given the
classical information asymetry between principal and agent. Relevant theoretic ￿ndings include Benabou
and Tirole (2006), who ￿nd that extrinsic incentives can crowd out prosocial behaviour via a feed back
loop to reputational signaling concerns. The reputational concern re￿ ects the possibility that increased
monetary incentives might negatively a⁄ect the agent￿ s utility as observers are tempted to conclude
greediness rather than social responsibility when observing prosocial actions. This signal extraction
problem arises because agents are heterogenous in their valuation of social good and reputation and this
information is strictly private. This sort of considerations could in￿ uence not only employees, consumers
or private donors, but also social entrepreneurs. Baron (2005) de￿nes a social entrepreneur as "one who
is willing to create a CSR ￿rm at a ￿nancial loss". (The opposite would be the private entrepreneur,
"who creates a ￿rm if and only if its market value exceeds the capital required to create it" (= a monetary
participation constraint)). In sum, CSR here expands the "social" individual￿ s opportunity set to do
good by the option to create a CSR ￿rm. A non-trivial implication proposed by Baron builds upon
reputational concerns in the sense that if citizens reward social behaviour not only in the market place
(strategic CSR) but also in a more societal environment, then also managers working in large companies
will carry CSR beyond its strategic level (of maximized market value). Although this behaviour might
be optimal from the managers￿point of view, it constitutes moral hazard if shareholders are purely pro￿t
oriented. Summing up, agents are motivated by a mixture of extrinsic (classical) and intrinsic factors,
therefore potential non-intended (counterintuitive) e⁄ects should be taken into account when designing
optimal incentives.
Yet another role this new set of preferences could play leads back to the above outlined welfare
analysis of corporate provision of public goods. It has been proposed that stakeholders use CSR to
do social good in line with their intrinsic motivation, and the key question that follows, this time
with respect to alternative private ways of doing social "good", asks why this "corporate channel" of
ful￿lling ones need to do public good is used at all if there are alternatives of direct social contribution.
Again, from a welfare perspective, there should be some comparative advantage of CSR, something
that makes it more e¢ cient than individual supply. In an important paper, Andreoni (1989) compares
di⁄erent ways to contribute to a social good and asks whether they constitute perfect or rather imperfect
substitutes. Although the initial version compares public and private (direct) provision of public goods,
19For an overview of the key ideas and contributions underlying Behavioural Economics see Behavioural Economics:
Past, Present and Future (Camerer and Loewenstein (2002)).
9the same analysis can be extended to compare various ways of private provision such as corporate and
individual social responsibility. If there exists a "warm glow" e⁄ect of individual (direct) altruistic
giving, then investment into a CSR ￿rm, government provision of a public good and direct donations
are imperfect substitutes that imperfectly crowd out each other. In other words, a socially responsible
consumer might not derive the same utility from buying a "social product" and from donating money to
charitable organizations directly. For a more detailed investigation of motives for charitable donations
see Andreoni (1990), Buraschi and Cornelli (2003) or Croson and Shang (2005). A special analysis
of how government incentives a⁄ect individual donations is performed by Pittel and R￿bbelke (2004).
Special attention is paid to the e⁄ects of granting tax deductibles on private public good provision
when income tax schemes are progressive. Potential outcomes in terms of welfare and level of donations
￿rst crucially depend upon deductible ceilings, progressiveness of tax rates as well as preferences of
agents, and second Pareto improvements might result at the expense of some agents utility. However,
these analyses are unable to explain why individuals allocate a share of their "endowment to do social
good" to CSR. A reasonable conjecture might be that people must or want to consume certain private
goods, but derive disutility from being connected to any socially stigmatized behaviour or direct negative
externality related to their purchase and/or use of the good or service (e.g. ￿rms using child labor or
acting environmentally hazardous during the production process)20. Such motivation might appeal to
both consumers endowed with social preferences independent of their consumption pattern and those
consumers, who only have social conscience considerations in relation with their consumption of relevant
private goods21. In both cases, but especially in the second one, CSR might be the preferred/optimal way
of maximizing individual utility subject to social/environmental concerns22. However, this conjecture
has yet to be tested empirically.
Finally, CSR often has been connected with advertisment or public relations of ￿rms, thereby suggest-
ing that CSR eventually could change preferences and ultimately individual behaviour over time. While
the management literature has approached these issues via the concept of Corporate Social Marketing
(Kotler and Lee 2004), economists have been more cautious when it comes to endogenous preferences.
When it comes to preference formation, Becker (1993) concluded that "attitudes and values of adults
are ... in￿ uenced by their childhood experiences". Bowles (1998) builds the bridge from Becker￿ s "family
environment" to markets and other economic institutions in￿ uencing the evolution of values, preferences
and motivations. Simon (1991) was among the ￿rst to argue that agency problems may be best over-
come by attempting to change and ideally align preferences of workers and principals. At the same time,
empirical evidence from the General Social Survey (1991)23 suggests that workers strongly identify with
their organization (i.e. employer￿ s preferences). In theory, this ￿nding can be a result of matching (se-
lection), reducing cognitive dissonance (psychology) or induced convergence of preferences (endogenous
preferences). Given these alternatives, CSR could be either interpreted as a signal leading to matching
or alternatively used to "streamline" agents￿preferences over time. While the latter suggestion lacks the-
oretic or empirical treatment24, the former potential matching (selection) role of CSR has been analyzed
in more detail. The major result of this research is the notion of reduced agency cost due to matching
motivated agents and principals as put forward in Besley and Ghatak (2005). Their focus is on the
mission oriented sector (NGOs, public administrations, not for pro￿t in general), and they show that
matched preferences, in their words motivation, allow for a reduction of high powered incentives (bonus
payments) without any loss of e¢ ciency. In reality, however, the border between pro￿t and mission
orientation is increasingly getting blurred, i.e. many ￿rms adopt missions (various CSR activities) in
20Note that these social or environmental goods do not always directly/physically a⁄ect consumers, but rather are feeding
through to individual utility indirectly via intrinsic, reputational concerns.
21I would like to thank Mathew Gentzkow for a clarifying discussion of this point. For an overview see again Graph 1.
22On the one hand, a person having a strong preference for social or environmental good and donating a lot of money to
charity might not want to send a contradictive signal via her consumption behavior and therefore demand CSR products.
On the other hand, somebody that does not per se care about social or environmental good but about reputation in
general (given that the public or a relevant societal subgroup has social preferences) might deem social or environmental
performance by producers of her consumption goods as very important for her own utility (pure signaling).
23The General Social Survey is a national US survey of demographic and attitudinal variables with a sample size of about
3000. It asks employees about their job satisfaction and work organization in general.
24to the best of my knowledge.
10their quest to maximize pro￿ts. Would this interpretation of CSR then lead to similar conclusions about
incentive payment or preference distribution among workers in and across ￿rms with varying degrees of
CSR engagement?
It can be seen that a lot of open questions need to be answered when it comes to the mechanics of
intrinsic motivation and social preferences within the human mind. However, further discussion of CSR
focuses on the economics of the ￿rm￿ s interaction with various stakeholders and treats the existence of
intrinsic preferences as exogenously given.
3.3 Six Strategies behind strategic CSR
This section identi￿es six relevant theoretic frameworks within which strategic CSR can arise, and links





5. Public Policy, and
6. Isomorphism.
3.3.1 The Labor Economics of CSR (Contract Theoretic approaches to CSR)
CSR might a⁄ect interaction between employers and employees and alter classical labor market outcomes.
Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001) adress the role of preferences in an employer-employee (Principal-
Agent) relationship. Their main idea is that employees might have general preferences such as sense
of personal e¢ cacy or rate of time preference that are able to compensate for monetary incentives and
therefore allow the employer to induce e⁄ort at lower cost incentive enhancing. The conclusions suggest
an important role of preferences in determining the cost of labor services and a⁄ecting earnings of
employees and employers alike. In this spirit, Besley and Ghatak (2005) establish a theoretic framework
to analyze the role and interaction of monetary and non monetary incentives in labor contracts within
the non-pro￿t sector. They refer to not for pro￿t organizations as being mission oriented and conjecture
that such organizations, (e.g. hospitals or universities) frequently are sta⁄ed by intrinsically motivated
agents25. The main conclusion from their moral hazard model with heterogenous principals and agents
is that pecuniary, extrinsic incentives such as bonus payments and the agents￿intrinsic motivation can
act as substitutes. In other words, a match between a mission oriented principal and an intrinsically
motivated agent allows for reduced contractual bonus payments and still induces the standard second
best e⁄ort level. In case of more than two types,a better match implies a higher substitution e⁄ect
between money and motivation.
As opposed to Friedman￿ s concern that CSR is a form of moral hazard, Brekke and Nyborg (2004)
based on Brekke et al. (2003) show that CSR can actually reduce moral hazard in the labor market
context. More precisely, CSR serves as a screening device for ￿rms that want to attract morally motivated
agents. This interpretation builds upon the above outlined main insight of Besley and Ghatak (2005)
and is subject to the same substitutability of motivation and high powered incentives.
Another labor market context that involves CSR and corporate governance is explored by Cespa and
Cestone (2007). They conjecture that ine¢ cient managers can and will use CSR, i.e. the execution of
stakeholder protection and relations, as an e⁄ective entrenchment strategy to protect their jobs. Their
discussion of the e⁄ect of corporate governance institutions on ￿rm value leads to the conclusion that
25Think of a doctor or professor, who has a non-pecuniary interest in the hospital￿ s or university￿ s success, i.e. saving
lives or educating students.
11institutionalized stakeholder relations close this "insurance" channel for ine¢ cient managers and increase
managerial turnover and ￿rm value. This ￿nding also provides a rationale for the existence of special
institutions such as ethical indices or social auditors and increased interaction between social activists
and institutional shareholders in general. A similar approach to CSR is taken by Baron (2006b), who
links managerial incentives (contracts) with socially responsible consumers. He adresses the interplay
of consumer preferences, the ability of managers, managerial incentive design and social expenditures.
The main focus is on the interplay between social expenditure and ￿nancial performance of ￿rms. Both
are jointly determined, i.e. causality can go both ways, and the major explanatory variable is whether
consumers do have social preferences or not. After introducing managers￿ability it is concluded that
higher demand for social goods empowers the pro￿t incentives by managers and compensation for man-
agers is positively correlated with social expenditure (i.e. managers are encouraged to spend socially as
demand and hence pro￿ts will then be maximized). When times are good and consumers value CSR,
a positive correlation emerges between CSR and ￿nancial performance and the level of both, CSR and
pro￿ts, is increasing in managers￿ability. In bad times, however, shareholders are not supporting social
expenditure (for pro￿ts) anymore and the correlation becomes negative.
Baron￿ s work gives a ￿rst idea of the importance of consumer preferences in the determination of
CSR e⁄orts, which will be treated within the following subsection.
3.3.2 CSR and Product Markets (Socially Responsible Consumption)
Consumers and their social preferences may translate into demand for CSR and induce pro￿t maximizers
to supply levels of CSR dependent on their competitive envirnment. If there is competition in the private
goods market, CSR can either act as product di⁄erentiation, or even trigger competition with respect to
the level of CSR itself.
The ￿rst question to ask is whether the assumption that consumers really care about CSR is justi￿ed.
There is substantial empirical evidence that this is the case. Consumer surveys reveal that consumers￿
assessment of ￿rms and products as well as their ￿nal consumption decisions depend on ￿rms￿CSR
records. The Millenium Poll on CSR26, the largest global survey of public expectations of corporations
conducted in 1999, documented that over 25,000 individuals across 23 countries on six continents revealed
that their assessment of ￿rms depends on its CSR record. Two out of three people want companies to go
beyond pro￿t maximization and contribute to broader society goals. Worldwide, one third of interviewees
said they form impressions of a company based on business fundamentals such as ￿nancial factors,
company size, business strategy or management, while 40 per cent mention brand quality or corporate
image or reputation. A majority (almost 60 per cent) mention factors related to a company￿ s broader
responsibilities - labor practices, business ethics, responsibility to society at large, or environmental
impacts to be important determinants of their opinion about a ￿rm. This perception also translates into
action as nearly half of American consumers say their perception of a company led them to consider
rewarding or punishing a company by purchasing or not purchasing its products or services, or by
speaking up for or against an organization. Around the world, 40% of the 25,000 respondents have
thought in the past year about punishing a speci￿c company perceived as not socially responsible. Other
consumer surveys such as the one conducted by MORI27 in the UK in 2003 con￿rm this picture by ￿nding
that 70% of consumers are willing to pay more for a product that they perceive as ethically superior.
Cotte and Trudel (2008) ￿nd the equivalent to loss aversion in consumers￿willingness to pay for ethical
products. According to their ￿ndings consumers are willing to pay a premium for ethical products and
buy unethical goods at a comparatively steeper discount.
So both consumption and willingness to pay may be in￿ uenced by CSR. Given that ￿rms compete for
consumers with such preferences, CSR may be correlated with the degree of competition in the market.
Bagnoli and Watts (2003) model competitive product markets with homogeneous, socially responsible
consumers. They conclude that competition for these consumers, who are willing to pay a premium
26Environics International, Ltd., The Prince of Wales Business Leaders and The Conference Board. (1999). "Millennium
Poll on Corporate Social Responsibility: Executive brie￿ng". Toronto, Canada.
27IPSOS MORI has been merged in 2005 and is now the second largest research company in the UK. Further information
can be found under http://www.ipsos-mori.com/about/index.shtml.
12for impure public goods (remember CSR de￿ned as the corporate provision of public goods alongside
private goods), leads to private provision of public goods (=CSR) as a by-product and at levels that
vary inversely with the degree of competitiveness in the private goods market28. A more competitive
environment in terms of prices (Bertrand competition as compared to Cournot) reduces a ￿rm￿ s mark
up and its ability to use this mark up to increase CSR. This leads to reduced competitiveness in terms
of product di⁄erentiation via CSR, and hence to reduced overall CSR activity. In sum, there exists
a trade o⁄ between e¢ cient provision of the private good and e¢ cient provision of the public good,
i.e. although both Bertrand and Cournot competition entail lower than e¢ cient levels of CSR, but
levels of CSR are higher under Cournot competition. A similar analysis of strategic CSR in a Cournot
oligopoly by Manasakis et al. (2007) suggests that all ￿rms hire socially responsible managers due
to Stackelberg leadership motives. This increases equilibrium output and, dependent on consumers
preferences, managers￿decisions in favor of CSR increase or decrease pro￿ts.
If ￿rms (Bertrand) compete in markets populated by heterogenous consumers, i.e. consumers with
and without preferences for the joint corporate provision of a private and public good, Besley and
Ghatak (2007) ￿nd that there exists a unique separating equilibrium, where ￿rms make zero pro￿ts.
The level of CSR is equivalent to the one under pure private provision of the public good by consumers
and therefore second best only. The analysis in this framework allows validation of a whole array of
standard results from the screening and public goods literature. The maximum sustainable level of CSR
is achieved when the incentive compatibility constraint of caring consumers binds, while an exogenous
increase of public good supply (e.g. by a government) perfectly crowds out competitive provision of CSR.
In the absence of government failure, governments are able to implement the ￿rst best level of public
good (Lindahl-Samuelson) and have a comparative advantage vis-a-vis ￿rms, which cannot be perfectly
monitored. However, as soon as governments fail, CSR might generate a Pareto improvement, while
CSR and provision by non-pro￿ts are identical unless one or the other has a technological advantage in
producing the public good. Finally, a small uniform regulation would leave the level of CSR unchanged
and redistribute contributions from social to neutral consumers, while large regulatory intervention can
raise supply of the public good to its ￿rst best level given that neutral consumers are willing to pay
higher prices for the private good. These ￿ndings can be interpreted as justifying CSR as an economically
optimal, sustainable way of providing public goods if governments fail29, NGOs do not have a comparative
advantage (i.e. lower production costs) over ￿rms, and consumers are able to monitor ￿rms to some
extent.
Yet another approach towards modeling supply of CSR due to consumer demand has been proposed by
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995). They model CSR as ￿rm self regulation, i.e. voluntary overcompliance
with environmental regulation, and assume that although consumers all value environmental quality, they
vary in their willingness to pay a price premium for CSR, which is positively dependent on their income
levels30. Firms play a two stage duopoly game and ￿rst decide about CSR (clean technology), and then
compete a la Bertrand. The subgame perfect equilibrium entails ￿rms di⁄erentiating themselves via
catering to di⁄erent sets of consumers. Choosing technology acts as product positioning similar to the
choice of product quality, and CSR is positively correlated with the income levels of either all consumer
segments or of the lowest income segment. Similar to Besley and Ghatak (2007), the comparative statics
allow for an analysis of government policy. The main ￿nding here is that if a minimum standard is
imposed and actually binds on the "worse" ￿rm (lower CSR), the better ￿rm will overmeet the standard.
CSR subsidies can have the same e⁄ect as standards, while taxes always reduce output (here: number
of consumers served) and CSR e⁄orts by all ￿rms.
Finally, product characteristics are often di¢ cult to observe and subject to information asymmetry
between consumers and ￿rms. In this context, Siegel and Vitaliano (2006) test and con￿rm the hypothesis
that ￿rms selling experience or credence goods are more likely to be socially responsible than ￿rms selling
28Competitiveness is re￿ected through both number of ￿rms and ￿rm entry.
29Government failure could be either inferior technology (i.e. higher production costs), distributional preferences for
neutral or social consumers or opportunistic politicians.
30The conjecture that higher income leads to lower disutility from paying price premia for CSR suggest some Maslow
type argument at the bottom of social/environmental preference formation and may explain why CSR is originating in the
developed world (high income countries).
13search goods. This lends support to the conjecture that consumers consider CSR as a signal about
attributes and general quality31 of the private good. Here, ￿rms use CSR to di⁄erentiate their product,
advertise it, and build brand loyalty. The advertising dimension of CSR is especially strong when social
e⁄orts are unrelated to business conduct. In Navarro (1988) corporate donations to charity are identi￿ed
as advertisement and CSR is meant to transmit a positive signal about ￿rm quality/type . However,
according to Becker-Olsen and Hill (2005) this signal might not necessarily be positive, as consumers
are able to identify low ￿t CSR as advertisment and tend to negatively perceive such CSR e⁄orts as
greediness of ￿rms rather than genuine interest into social or environmental concerns.
3.3.3 CSR and Financial Markets (Socially Responsible Investment)
Also investors care about CSR, and ￿rms, which compete for equity investment on stock markets, will
have to take that into account. Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005) among others, put forward strong
evidence of the increasing importance of CSR on ￿nancial markets. A new form of investment, so called
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), has come into being. SRI is de￿ned by the Social Investment
Forum (SIF) as an investment process that considers the social and environmental consequences of in-
vestments, both positive and negative, within the context of rigorous ￿nancial analysis. Social investors
today include both private and institutional ones (in the US over 50% of investors take investment deci-
sion based on social criteria32). Large pension funds allocate their investment based on CSR reports and
ratings (such as those provided by GMI33 in the US or KLD34) and organizations such as the Council on
Institutional Investors (CII) or the Association of British Insurers (ABI), which control approximately
$1.5 trillion and $1 trillion, respectively, have each issued statements that corporate social responsibility
is a key factor of long-term ￿nancial success (SIF, 2001).More precisely, the US Social Investment Fo-
rum35 reports 10.8% of total investment under professional management in 2007 to be socially responsible
(see Table 1), i.e. using one or more of the three core socially responsible investing strategies￿ screening,
shareholder advocacy, and community investing. In Europe the European Sustainable and Responsible
Investment Forum (EuroSIF) identi￿es e336 billion in assets to be SRI. In October 2006, Fortune Mag-
azine similarily reported36 that US $2.3 trillion out of US $24 trillion of assets under management in
the US are invested in ￿rms that rate highly on some measure of social responsibility. The trend points
upward in most ￿nancial markets, e.g. in the US SRI assets grew 4% faster than total assets and over
258% in absolute terms between 1995 and 2005.
Year SRI/US Total US Investment SRI Growth Total Investment Growth
(trillion US$) (trillion US$) ( %) (%)
1995 0.639 7 - -
2007 2.710 25.100 324.1 258.6
Table 1: Socially Responsible Investment37 in the US since 1995 (source: US Social Investment
31in line with Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
32See the 2001 Opinion Research Corporation Poll (sponsored by MMA-Praxis).
33Governance Metrics International produces in depth ratings on CSR and governance on 2000 companies worldwide.
Its client base includes Atate Street Bank, TIAA-CREF and ABP, the largest pension fund in Europe.
34Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini is a ￿rm rating the social performance of ￿rms . A social index based on the Russell
1000 Index, which covers more than 90% of US stock market capitalization, is constructed.
35The US Social Investment Forum is the national trading body for Socially Responsible Investment (SRI). The ￿gures
are taken from the Forum￿ s 2005 SRI Trends in the US report.
36based on a survey by AccountAbility and CSR network
37SRI refers to investment under professional management and chosen after applying at least one of the following social
investment strategies: Screening (i.e. the practice of including or excluding publicly traded securities from investment
portfolios or mutual funds based on social and/or environmental criteria), Shareholder Advocacy or Community Investing
(i.e. ￿nancing that generates resources and opportunities for economically disadvantaged people in urban and rural com-
munities in the U.S. and abroad that are underserved by traditional ￿nancial institutions). Therefore SRI serves as an
indicator for the level of ￿rm engagement into CSR.
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Having the above outlined typology of CSR (Graph 1) in mind, we know that investors (=potential
shareholders) either have or don￿ t have social preferences. Neutral investors just have their monetary
return on investment in mind and, hence, just care about ￿rm pro￿ts. It follows that such investors
will use SRI as an investment strategy only if investment in respective ￿rms qualifying as SRI actually
translates into higher returns on investment. In terms of Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) this
would imply that ￿rms doing CSR are actually performing better ￿nancially. It is exactly this conjecture
and the related questions of correlation and causality that have attracted a lot of attention in the scarce
empirical literature on CSR. A comprehensive survey is provided by Margolis and Walsh (2003). Taking
into account 127 published empirical studies between 1972 and 2002 they conclude that a majority of these
studies ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant and positive correlation between CSP and CFP in both directions
(i.e. causality is running fromm CFP to CSP and vice versa). Some regressions yield statistically non
signi￿cant coe¢ cients, and a negligible number of results suggests a negative relationship. However, it is
emphasized that there exist sampling problems, concerns about the validity of CSP and CFP measures
and instruments, ommitted variable bias and the ultimate (and still unanswered) question of causality
between CSP and CFP. A ￿rst attempt to adress inconsistency and misspeci￿cation is the work by
McWilliams and Siegel (2000). They regress ￿rm ￿nancial performance on CSR and control for R&D
investment. It follows that the upwards bias of the ￿nancial impact of CSR disappears and a neutral
correlation emerges. This result is not particularly surprising as CSR very often entails the use of
advanced technologies, therefore CSR and R&D might be strongly correlated (endogenous). In any case,
further studies will have to clarify whether "greedy" investors should put their money into SRI and the
underlying CSR e⁄ort quali￿es as "strategic".
Alternatively, SRI can be a way for social investors to enforce their preferences through a demand
channel similar to the one consumers use. The group of social investors, however, can be heterogenous
in the sense that there might be those for whom corporate giving is a close substitute for personal giving
and those, for whom it is a poor substitute (Baron 2005). It seems logic that the former subgroup is
more likely holding shares in CSR ￿rms. Small and Zivin (2005) con￿rm this conjecture by focusing
on the relationship between CSR, investment behaviour and ￿rm valuation. They derive a "Modigliani
Miller" theory of CSR, where the fraction of investors that prefers corporate philantropy over private
charitable giving (exactly the "key type" of investors identi￿ed above) drives CSR by ￿rms attempting to
maximize their valuation (share prices). A share constitutes a charity-investment bundle matching social
and monetary preferences of investors with those of the ￿rm￿ s management. The main conclusion is that
if all investors consider CSR and private charity as perfect substitutes, share prices and the aggregate
level of philantropy are una⁄ected by CSR. If they are imperfect substitutes, a strictly positive level
of CSR maximizes share prices and hence the value of a corporation. A related natural experiment is
provided by the correlation between corporate tax rates and the social performance of ￿rms.
3.3.4 CSR and Private Politics (Social Activism)
The existence and success/impact of social or environmental activists is intimately related with informa-
tion asymetries between companies and the outside world. The rationale of Social Activism is that the
threat of negative publicity (revelation of negative information) due to actions by an unsatis￿ed activist
motivates CSR. As soon as the activist is credible and has the ability to damage a ￿rm￿ s reputation or
cause substantial costs to the ￿rm, the existence of such an activist is su¢ cient to integrate CSR as part
of corporate strategy (D. Baron refers to this as integrated strategy). The logic is comparable to the one
of "hedging" against future risk in ￿nancial markets, just here the ￿rm insures itself against a potential
campaign by an activist. Baron (2001) explicitly adds this threat by an activist, who is empowered
with considerable support by the public, to the set of motivations for stategic CSR. CSR is referred to
as corporate redistribution to social causes motivated by either pro￿t maximization (1), altruism (2) or
threats by an activist (3). However, it can be argued that the existence of activism quali￿es CSR as an
integral part of pro￿t maximization, i.e. motivation 3 fuses in 1.
The main insights from the analysis of CSR and Social Activism can be summarized as follows: CSR
15induced by private politics has two qualitatively di⁄erent e⁄ects on ￿rms in competitive markets. The
￿rst one is a direct cost e⁄ect for those ￿rms that are targeted by an activist, i.e. costs are increasing
due to CSR. This e⁄ect is even stronger for ￿rms acting in a highly competitive environment (e.g. low
product di⁄erentiation). In other words the degree of competition is positively correlated with the power
of an activist boycott and strenghtens the ex ante (threat) bargaining position of the activist. On the
other hand, CSR can have a strategic e⁄ect that alters the competitive position of a ￿rm. What is meant
here is that CSR can take wind out of the sails of any potential activist and reduce the likelihood of
being targeted in the future. This result roots in the assumption that in a way the activist also acts
strategically and chooses "projects" that promise to be successful, i.e. weaker ￿rms are easier targets.
Finally, the existence of spill over e⁄ects from one ￿rm to other ￿rms or even the whole industry can
act as an ampli￿er to activist power on the one hand, and motivation for (often observed) concerted non
market action by ￿rms in the same industry on the other (e.g. voluntary industry standards).
In a similar game theoretic (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) setting, Baron (2006a) predicts market
values of ￿rms, prices, pro￿ts, contributions to activists and the level of corporate social performance in a
model of product and capital markets with strategic consumers, investors and activists38. Social pressure
is arising endogenously in equilibrium. The new feature is that citizens can distinguish between strategic
CSR (induced by social pressure) and truly altruistic CSR ("moral management", not for pro￿t). If
they actually do so, then in case the morally managed ￿rm can signal its type and achieve a repuational
advantage, social pressure will be directed towards self interested ￿rms. If citizens are not distinguishing,
morally motivated ￿rms are more likely targeted. It shall be mentioned here that the distinction between
strategic and not-for-pro￿t CSR can be extremely di¢ cult, subtle and based on perception rather than
facts. Recent work done by Marketing scholars lends support to this proposition. Becker-Olsen and Hill
(2005) ￿nd that consumers form their beliefs about CSR based on perceived ￿t and timing of related
e⁄orts, i.e. a high ￿t between CSR and the ￿rm￿ s area of expertise (business area) as well as proactive
rather than reactive social initiatives tend to streamline consumers￿beliefs, attitudes and intentions with
those of the strategic ￿rm.
Another interesting insight arises from the possibility to monetary support activists who di⁄er in
quality (Baron 2006a). It follows that high quality activists attract greater contributions and then are
more likely to identify and target self interested ￿rms, while the opposite holds for low quality activists.
As far as market prices and values of ￿rms are concerned, the (equilibrium) results are standard in
the sense that (1) prices signal type and lead to consumer selection (altruistic ￿rm, high price and
social consumer versus pro￿t maximizing ￿rm, low price and neutral consumer) and (2) the distribution
of shareholders￿social preferences determines the value of ￿rms because it determines the ability to
attract equity investment. The contributions to the activists are similarily dependent on people￿ s social
preferences.
The impact of public interest advocacy and action either through activist groups or concerted con-
sumer boycotts has also been analyzed from a marketing perspective (see Smith (2000) or Klein, Smith
and John (2002)). Clearly, Marketing can be used to build reputation and avoid any form of activism that
could harm business conduct. Recent innovations in Marketing techniques take consumer perceptions
with respect to CSR into account and led to a stepwise development from Cause-Related to Social-Cause
Marketing (Bloom et al. (2006)) to Corporate Social Marketing (Kotler and Lee (2004)). As negative
reputation can harm a ￿rm across all its activity areas through so called "halo e⁄ects", CSR can again
act as a reputation insurance, an attribute shared with classical Marketing. In sum, consumer/activist
perceptions translate into views and beliefs that form the basis for action. CSR done well can build
reputation and insure the ￿rm against boycotts or private activism.
3.3.5 CSR and Public Politics (Regulation)
CSR is de￿ned as corporate social or environemntal e⁄ort beyond legal requirements or regulations. So
if being in accordance with laws does not qualify as CSR, how can public politics actually stimulate
38The set up is close to a general equilibrium theoretic framework. the equilibrium concept used, however, is game
theoretic in nature.
16CSR? The answer involves a logic similar to the one behind private politics. It is the threat of future
regulations and the adjustment costs they would entail that act as an incentive to hedge against such
an event and build a strategic "bu⁄er zone" via CSR (overcompliance). The threat stems from having
a competitive disadvantage and high adjustment costs (due to e.g. new technologies) in face of an
unexpected regulation. By doing CSR ￿rms not only are safe in the event of regulation, but also
might discourage government (public) intervention by signaling that markets can self-regulate its agents.
Clearly, it is the classical dichotomy between public and private sectors that is at stake here.
Hence, it is again the public goods literature and its analysis of private versus public provision as well
as related phenomena such as Crowding Out that serves as point of departure. Having Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986) in mind, one could ask whether CSR actually can crowd out public provision of public
goods and to which extent the market itself (through inducing strategic CSR) can provide for the optimal
level of public goods. A good understanding of the interaction between CSR and regulation then allows
to adress related policy issues such as the optimal level of regulation in the presence of CSR and the
relationship between investment in CSR and ￿rm performance (see the Editorial by D. Paton of a special
issue of Structural Change and Economic Dynamics Vol.16 (2005) for an overview of contributions on
the latter questions). Given knowledge about how to stimulate CSR, governments intending to provide
a certain level of public goods could consider an alternative set of policiy tools rather than regulation or
taxation that are disturbing markets less.
Calveras et al. (2006) study the interplay between activism, regulation and CSR and ￿nd that
private (activism) and public politics (regulation) are imperfect substitutes. It follows that increased self
regulation (i.e. CSR) can crowd out formal government regulation. It is emphasized that when society
free rides on a small group of activist consumers, loose formal regulation (voted for by the majority of non
activists) might lead to an ine¢ ciently high externality level where activist consumers bear the related
cost via high prices for socially responsible goods. This conclusion draws attention to another relevant
correlation, namely between regulation and political orientation. The underlying assumption is that the
agents￿consumption strategy not only depends on the distribution of social preferences over the whole
population, but also in￿ uences decision making as a voter. Consumers are also voters, and not only
￿rms, but also governments will want to signal their type. As governments signal through legislation or
regulation and ￿rms through CSR, the interaction between regulation and CSR is an important subject
of further investigation39.
Empirical work has been done by Kagan, Gunningham and Thornton (2003), who adress the e⁄ect
of regulation on corporate environmental behaviour. Studying 14 pulp and paper producing mills across
the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, they ￿nd that regulation cannot explain di⁄erences in
environmental performance across ￿rms. This conclusion stems from the fact that variation in behaviour
is not found across di⁄erent regulatory districts, but across ￿rms in one district. They attribute this
variance to "social license" pressures (induced by local communities and activists in the spirit of private
politics) as well as to di⁄erent corporate environmental management styles. In sum, regulation matters
to a large extent, but variation in "beyond compliance" is subject to the antagonism between social
pressure and economic feasibility. The potential impact of local comunities￿social pressures on local
corporations constitutes the subject of the next subsection.
3.3.6 Isomorphism
While the relevant "social pressure groups" in the ￿ve previous cases were employees, consumers, in-
vestors, activists or governments, the incentive to do CSR here roots in isomorphic pressures within
geographic communities or functional entities such as industries. It is the institutional environment and
commonly (locally) accepted norms, views and values that might discipline ￿rms into certain social be-
haviour. Institutional factors that are potentially shaping the nature and level of CSR in a community
include cultural-cognitive forces, social-normative factors as well as regulative factors. The inclusion of
regulative community factors complements the analysis of public politics by testing whether di⁄erences
39In my working paper "Incentives and the Corporate Provision of Public Goods" I show that, when reputation is
important for ￿rms, CSR subsidies might not stimulate the supply of CSR in the economy.
17in regulation on a community level imply di⁄erent levels and nature of CSR by ￿rms located in these
communities. In other words, subsidiarity in regulation implies variation across regions (local entities),
and therefore, comparing similar ￿rms located in di⁄erent regulatory environments can give hints about
its correlation with CSR.
Marquis, Glynn and Davis (2007) identify, in an institutional theoretic setting, community isomor-
phism, i.e. the degree of conformity of corporate social performance in focus, form and level within a
community, as a potential explanatory variable for empirical observations concerning CSR. Isomorphic
pressures may also arise within industries, and may lead to industry wide self regulatory activities. Es-
pecially industries that are well organized and represented by a centralized lobby might be able to exert
pressure on ￿rm behaviour.
4 Some Empirical Issues
Although empirical evidence of CSR (SRI or the proliferation of related standards) and the underlying
incentives to do it (stakeholder preferences) exists, the empirical literature on CSR is in an infant state
and far from fully exploiting all theoretical propositions in the ￿eld. The ￿rst and foremost challenge
to empirical analysis is to measure CSR in a commonly agreed, scienti￿cally correct and homogenous
way. Homogeneity is crucial in developing a level playing ￿eld that allows to assess whether competing
results are truly competing and general conclusions are truly general. Codes of conduct, standards and
monitoring systems that have arisen recently include SA8000 (1998) and ISO14000/1, both issued by the
International Standards Organization, or the UN Global Compact initiative40 (2000). These estimations
of CSR share the common goal to give a picture of a particular ￿rm￿ s CSR e⁄orts, but they vary in the
underlying criteria, certi￿cation requirements (veri￿cation) and focus (even de￿nition of CSR). However,
as stakeholders use these measures and indices as baseline information about CSR practices, ￿rms actually
react to disclosure of information via such measures. Chatterji, Levine and To⁄el (2007) examine the
predictive validity of environmental ratings using the KLD rating that has been used by many others
as a proxy for CSR. It is a ￿rst attempt to adress the question of which metric is a good predictor of a
￿rm￿ s actual performance. This is of special interest to those (investors or consumers), who base their
decisions upon such measurements of CSR. Similarily, Chatterji and Levine (2005) evaluate the role of
non ￿nancial performance measures and stress not only the importance of reliable, valid and comparable
metrics, but also the unique role managers should play in their development. The strategic perspective
again stems from the fact that it is third parties that measure CSR and publish this information, which
ultimately serves various key stakeholders as a basis for decision making. Hence, in order to manage risk,
portfolio theory adresses direct ￿nancial risks, while a general CSR measurement framework is crucial
for predicting perceived non-￿nancial performance. Banker et al. (2000) empirically underline the long
term correlation between non-￿nancial performance measurement (such as product quality or customer
satisfaction) and ￿nancial performance, which they translate into an important factor for designing
managerial incentives.
Assuming validity of certain measures of CSR solves the dependent variable question. The natural
next step is the identi￿cation of statistically signi￿cant independent variables explaining, determining or
predicting CSR levels. The following partial results have been achieved: In the aforementioned study by
Siegel and Vitaliano (2006) on CSR as a signal for product quality (of experience or credence goods),
no positive correlation between ￿rm size and CSR on the single cross section of data available was
found. Both tested hypotheses (i.e. CSR and credence goods and CSR and ￿rm scale e⁄ects) have been
advanced by McWilliams and Siegel (2001 - hypothesis 2 and 10, p.120 and 124), who do a cost bene￿t
analysis to determine the optimal, i.e. pro￿t maximizing, level of CSR. The explanatory variables in this
supply and demand model include ￿rm size, level of diversi￿cation, R&D, advertising, consumer income,
labor market conditions or stage in the industry life cycle. All hypotheses related to these variables
still remain to be tested. Videras and Alberini (2000) test potential reasons why ￿rms participate in
40The UN Global Compact initiative attracted over 1500 companies worldwide since the year 2000 and commits them
to uphold principles of human rights, environment and clean business practices.
18voluntary environmental programs (EPA41 programs). The empirical analysis ￿nds potential publicity
and ￿rm size to increase, and the previous environmental track record to negatively a⁄ect participation.
More precisely, all ￿rms participate more likely if possible publicity is positive - this is especially true
for ￿rms with high exposure to the public such as large corporations - and ￿rms already involved into
active communiaction with consumers use EPA programs to add credibility to their CSR e⁄orts. Bad
environmental performers are more likely to join if the program is directly related to the ￿rms￿pollution
reductions, i.e. this suggests again the quest for credibility and publicity, while corporations with lower
R&D expenditure are more likely to participate as they expect positive technology spill overs.
Another attempt to empirically investigate the determinants of CSR adds three new factors to the
above mentioned variables. Focusing on S&P42 500 ￿rms, Ceton and Liston- Heyes (2005) include the
political context in which the ￿rm operates, its involvement with secondary stakeholders and a ￿rm￿ s ISO
9000 status in the multiple regression analysis. They ￿nd that ￿rms (HQs) located in more conservative
political communities (states) exhibit lower levels of CSP, while corporations that also ful￿ll weaker
claims of less important stakeholder groups as well as ISO 9000 certi￿ed ￿rms are more likely to get
involved with CSP. While the ￿rst and potentially the third variable ￿t with the notion of strategic CSR
(especially isomorphism and hedge against local regulation), targeting of secondary stakeholders does
not directly reveal the demand side pressures as the strategic incentive at work.
5 Concluding Remarks
The message of this paper is that a fundamental understanding of CSR is emerging. Economically, CSR
can be but not necessarily is just the result of (1) social preferences of entrepreneurs and shareholders, or
(2) an immediate manifestation of managerial moral hazard towards pro￿t oriented shareholders. Based
on a new set of intrinsic (social or environmental) stakeholder preferences, CSR can be fully consistent
with the pro￿t maximizing strategy of any ￿rm committed to shareholder value. Characterized as action
beyond legal requirement, CSR quali￿es as strategic behaviour if consumers, investors or employees have
social preferences, and if these preferences translate into action with monetary e⁄ects for the ￿rm (e.g.
price premia can be charged or wages lowered). In addition, strategic consequences related to pro￿ts
and competitiveness may arise (1) if activists and/or governments threaten to impose costs and, hence,
competitive disadvantages on ￿rms via boycotts, negative publicity or regulation, or (2) if communities
and their values and norms were strong enough to weaken a non-aligned ￿rm￿ s position (isomorphism)
and pro￿tability.
Empirical evidence lends support to all of these incentives for strategic CSR, however, rigorous
statistical analysis is still in an infant state and subject to various problems including measurement
error, endogeneity and misspeci￿cation.
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